Implementing an ISR defense on a MIPS architecture

TítuloImplementing an ISR defense on a MIPS architecture
Tipo de publicaciónConference Paper
Año de publicación
2017
Autores
L. S. Sancho
E. G. Barrantes
Conference Name
2017 XLIII Latin American Computer Conference (CLEI)
Fecha de publicación
09/2017
Editorial
IEEE
Conference Location
Córdoba., Argentina
Número ISBN
978-1-5386-3057-0
URL
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8226448/
DOI
10.1109/CLEI.2017.8226448
Palabras clave
code injection attacks
complex memory management
cryptography
embedded system
embedded systems
Encryption
encryption circuits
Hardware
Instruction Set Randomization
instruction sets
integrated circuit design
integrated circuit testing
Internet of Things devices ecosystem
IoT
ISR
ISR defense
microprocessor chips
microprocessor without interlocked pipeline stages
MIPS processor
Pipelines
security of data
Silicon compounds
synthetic code injection attacks
XOR encryption
Resumen

Code injection attacks are an undeniable threat in today's cyberworld. Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) was initially proposed in 2003. This technique was designed to protect systems against code injection attacks by creating an unique instruction set for each machine, thanks to randomization. It is a promising technique in the growing embedded system and Internet of Things (IoT) devices ecosystem, where the lack of complex memory management make these devices more vulnerable. However, most of ISR implementations up to day are entirely software based. In this work, we implement hardware support for an ISR defense on an 32 bits, 5 pipeline stages MIPS processor (which is an embedded system compatible architecture). Two obfuscation schemes were implemented, one based on XOR encryption and the other on transposition. The hardware implementation was tested under synthetic code injection attacks and results shows the effectiveness of the defense using both encryption circuits.